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Summary findings
One of the apparent  inconsistencies in the breakup of  natural wealth) tend to be more integrated
such multinational  states as the Soviet Union,  internationally. For them, economic sovereignty is less
Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia is that while the  important because they need to export their resources
republics justified their decision by claiming that they  and the returns to their labor increase with international
wanted to increase ("regain") their sovereignty, the new  integration.
states' strong desire to join the European Union shows  a  More democratic countries also tend to be better
their intention to dissipate the very same newly acquired  integrated because in democracies the power of the
sovereignty. How can the two desires be reconciled?  political elite - who may often prefer not to be bound
Why would someone go through  the ordeal of secession  by international rules - is lessened.
in order to quickly get rid of the very sovereignty that  Testing these hypotheses on the 1993-94  data for 165
justified the secession? Or was sovereignty not the real  countries, Milanovic finds a statistically strong impact of
(or sole) goal behind the secessionist drive?  per capita wealth and democracy on international
Milanovic explains that full sovereignty (like the  integration. The effect of country size is weaker.
individual's "full freedom") is neither reachable for most  Milanovic discusses why different countries may wish
countries nor desirable - because greater sovereignty is  to form conglomerates, defined as looser or tighter
often traded for reduced income. Economic sovereignty  unions that imply shared sovereignty and redistribution
is normally limited in key areas: exchange rate policy (by  from richer to poorer members. He finds that the
rules stemming from IMF membership, for example, or  willingness to join conglomerates (free trade associations)
participation in regional currency systems), trade policy  is greater for countries that are relatively poor
(by GATT rules, for example), labor and banking  (compared with the average income of the "target"
regulations, accounting practices, and so on.  conglomerate), and for democracies. The country size
There is a tradeoff curve between sovereignty and  effect is U-shaped: the willingness to join conglomerates
income. Countries do not choose maximum sovereignty,  is high for small countries (whose sovereignty might
but an optimal one. They choose a combination of  actually increase in a conglomerate because of the
income and sovereignty that allows them to maximize  conglomerate's sovereignty-sharing features) and for very
welfare. But that combination ss  not the same for all  large countries that may expect to play the role of "core"
countries.  states.
*  Larger countries (measured by their GDP) have the  The key gain from independence for the relatively rich
"luxury" of choosing more sovereignty per unit of  republics that were former members of the Communist
income, simply because for them domestic markets are  conglomerates was not economic sovereignty  in itself
more important than for small countries.  but the ability to switch from a poor to a rich
* Countries with abundant  natural resources or very  conglomerate.
skilled labor (that is, with high per capita human and
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TRADE-OFF  BETWEEN INCOME AND SOVEREIGNTY
Branko Milanovic  '
[There  are three ways  in which countries  grow. First, by] "forming  a league consisting  of several
republics in which no one of them had preference, authority or rank above the others; and in
which, when other cities were acquired, they made them constituent  members  in the same way
as the Swiss act in our time, and as in Greece the Acheans and the Aetolians acted in olden
times...  .The reason why such a republic cannot  expand is that its members  are distinct..  .which
makes it difficult  for them to consult and to make decisions.  It means that they are less keen on
acquiring  dominion, for, since many  communities  share in that dominion,  they do not appreciate
further acquisition  in the same way as does a single republic which hopes to enjoy the whole.
Furthermore,  a league is governed  by a council, which must needs be slower in arriving at any
decision...  .The second  method  consists in forming  alliances  in which you reserve  to yourself  the
headship,  the seat in which the central authority  resides, and the right of initiative.  This was the
method adopted by the Romans. The third method is to make other states subjects instead of
allies, as the Spartans  and the Athenians  did... [This method] is quite useless, as can be seen in
the case  of the two republics  just mentioned.  For they came  to disaster  for the simple  reason that
they had acquired a  dominion they could not hold. For to undertake the responsibility of
governing  cities by force...  is a difficult and tiresome business".
Niccolo  Machiavelli,  The Discourses..., Chapter II.4, pp. 283-6; Pinguins edition.
'I am thankful  for comments  and suggestions  to Alberto Alesina, Ishac Diwan, Bill Easterly, Alan
Gelb, Bartek Kaminski, Phil Keefer, Ljubomir Madzar, Martha de Melo, Milic Milovanovic, Lant
Pritchett,  Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel,  Martin Schrenk, David Tarr, Francois Vaillancourt,  Panos Varangis,
and Christine  Wallich. Leslie Mohr provided valuable  research  assistance.2
1. Introduction
One of the apparent  inconsistencies in the break-up of the multinational states like the
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia is that while secessionist republics justified their
decision by claiming that they wanted to increase ("regain") their sovereignty, the new states'
strong desire to join the European Union shows the intention to dissipate the very same newly
acquired  sovereignty.2 How  are  the two  things  to  be  reconciled?  Why  would  someone go
through the ordeal of secession in order to quickly get rid of the very object that justified  the
secession? Or was not sovereignty the real or the sole goal behind the secessionist drive?
The objective of the paper is to explain this apparent inconsistency. In order to do so,
we start with some general observations on the relationship between income and sovereignty that
are supposed to apply to all countries.
We start by defining "income" and "sovereignty".  "Income" is easy to define: it is GDP
per capita. 3 "Sovereignty" requires some explanation. One can visualize sovereignty as varying
on a scale from 0 to 1. Zero would mean that the country can take no decision of its own. This
is the example, relatively rare nowadays, of colonies where all economic decisions are taken by
the metropolis. 1 represents full, unrestricted sovereignty where a country can pursue any policy
it likes. It is not held in check by any international agreements, rules, or interests of other states.
It is the state of full freedom for domestic policy makers. It is important to emphasize that full
sovereignty -not  unlike the individual's  "full freedom"-  is  neither a reachable position for
most countries,  nor a desirable one (because, as will be argued below,  greater sovereignty is
often traded  for smaller income).  In addition, the world populated by states that would enjoy
unrestricted sovereignty would not be necessarily a good place. But the point of full sovereignty
is a useful methodological device.
2The simultaneity  of national break-up and international  integration has attracted the attention of
economists.  Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore  (1995) and Alesina  and Spolaore  (1995) address  the issue of
optimal  country  size as the trade-off  between  lower cost of public good provision  and loss of "preference
homogeneity."  Bolton and Roland (1995)  regard the decision  to secede to result from balance  between
the gains from the ability  to select an optimal tax rate (closer  to the regional, vs. federal, preferences)
and costs due to loss of free trade.
31n  the rest of the analysis, the term income, unless otherwise  specified, will always  mean "income
per capita.  "3
Normally, however, country's  sovereignty in economic decision-making is limited. This
is the case for almost all countries in the world. These constraints may take many forms. Most
common constraints are international agreements through memberships in various organizations.
Others are bilateral arrangements, like voluntary export restraints. But the important point is that
economic sovereignty is normally limited in a number of key areas: exchange rate policy, trade
policy,  labor  and  banking  regulations,  accounting practices  etc.  To  give  a  few  examples.
Country's  exchange rate policy will follow the rules stemming from the IMF membership or
participation  in regional  currency  systems, like  EMS or CFA.  Some countries  entirely lack
sovereignty over the exchange rate policy if they use other country's  currency (Panama) or have
their own currency pegged to the DM or the dollar.4 In trade policies, rules that GATT and now
WTO members must follow are also limiting factors (agricultural subsidies, intellectual property
rights,  most  favored  nation  status  etc).  Memberships  in  various  organizations  further  limit
national economic sovereignty: the countries are obliged to permit free trade unions, to ban child
or  slave  labor,  to  follow  minimum  health  and  safety  standards,  even to  observe  limits  on
working hours.'  In banking, they are constrained through (e.g.)  the Basel agreement on capital
adequacy ratios,  in environmental matters by international environmental convention. Another
recent  example  is Energy  Charter  Treaty  signed  in  December  1994 by  some  50 countries.
According to Ruud Lubers,  "[it] lays down binding rules on the fair treatment of foreign trade,
investment and transit; and clear obligations in the field of competition and the environment. It
provides for binding international arbitration  to settle disputes between governments and,  on
investments matters, between governments and foreign investors. "6
Members  of  regional  economic  organization  have,  of  course,  even  more  stringent
restrictions on economic decision-making. Membership in the European Union imposes a number
of restrictions on its members:  from limits to  state subsidies to exact working hours of retail
stores and common classification of goods. As Krugman (1991, p.19)  opines: "Europe's  1992
4European  single currency is opposed (e.g.  in the UK and Germany)  on the grounds of loss of
sovereignty.
5Wallace  (1993, p.375), for example, writes: "Few would have appreciated..  .on [the UK] entering
the [European]  Community  that the whole context of domestic legislation  on women's working hours,
conditions,  even ages of retirement would be progressively  transformed by the spread of Community
jurisdiction.  "
6See The Economist,  May 27, 1995, p.8.4
is not so much a trade agreement  as an agreement  to coordinate  policies  that have historically
been regarded  as domestic." By 1999, if a EU country wants to participate  in a single-currency
area, it would  have  to meet targets  on inflation,  budget  deficit, public  debt-to-GDP  ratio, interest
rate and currency  stability. The European  Union recently  threatened  Spain, Portugal and Greece
with cuts in funding  unless they reduce their budget deficits. 7
The rest of the paper is organized  as follows. In Section  2, I derive the equilibrium  ratio
between sovereignty  and income for a single country. The derivation  proceeds by two steps.
First, I derive the trade-off  curve between  sovereignty  and income.  It gives  all the combinations
of sovereignty  and income that a country can theoretically  choose. Second, I derive country's
indifference  curve showing  what combinations  of income and sovereignty  are of equal value to
a country. Country's actual sovereignty  and income will then obtain at the point of where the
trade-off curve touches the highest indifference  curve. In Section 3, I discuss why different
countries  may wish to form conglomerates  (i.e. looser or tighter unions), and what it would
imply for their choice of equilibrium sovereignty and income. In  Section 4,  I discuss the
conditions  under which such conglomerates  might become unstable. This point leads us thus
straight  back to the initial question posed in the opening sentence  of the paper. Section 5 lists
some implications  of the hypothesis  considered  here.  Section  6 concludes  the paper.
7See  Reuters,  July 10, 1995.  Cut  in funding  is acceptable  under  the Maastricht  treaty  provisions.5
2. Equilibrium  of a single country
Deriving the trade-off between income and sovereignty
Country's  per capita income (y) can be, in a standard fashion, viewed as the outcome of
its physical and human capital stock per capita (k), natural resources per capita (r),  and -less
often used-  openness of the economy (o).8 The idea is that a more open economy allows the
country to enjoy economies of scale, to  specialize in the production of goods where it enjoys
comparative advantage, and thus, by better specialization to use more efficiently its capital and
natural  resources.'  In addition,  and sometimes  as a substitute to  openness,  a large  domestic
market can have a similar impact on the efficiency of use of capital. Given  the level of openness,
a country with a large domestic market (D) will have an advantage: larger D will enable it to
take advantage of economies of scale. We can thus write:
y  =  f  (k,r,o,D) =  f  [k(o,D), r(o,D)]  (1)
where we show that the value of capital and natural resources depends on the openness
of the economy and the size of the domestic market.
Combining for simplicity both types of capital (physical and human) and natural resources
under a single term endowments or "capital" (k) we obtain:
8See, however, Sachs and Warner (1995). There may be different definitions of openness (e.g.
exports and imports  divided by GDP). Following  Sachs and Warner (1995, p.22-4), we may define as
open an economy  where the five following  conditions  hold: (1) non-tariff  barriers cover less than 40
percent of trade, (2) average tariff rate is less than 40 percent, (3) black market exchange  rate deviates
from the official  by less than 20 percent, (4) country is non-socialist,  (5) there is no state monopoly  on
exports.
9Krugman  (1991, p. 8) writes: "A..  .gain from regional  free trade, which  is very important  in practice,
comes  from the increased  size and hence  both productive  efficiency  and competitiveness  of oligopolistic
markets  subject  to economies  of scale."  Pissarides  (1995)  argues  that trade liberalization  raises  the returns
to human  capital.6
y  = f  [k(o,D)]  (2)
where fk >0  (positive marginal product of "capital"'),  1  k>  0 (rising value of capital as
openness increases), and kD >0  (rising value of capital as the domestic market expands).'I
Let now sovereignty (s) be defined as a decreasing function of the country's  openness
(equation  3),  on  the  assumption  that  greater  openness,  i.e.  integration  in  world  economy,
requires that the country give up some of its national policy and legal prerogatives and substitute
international rules  to  domestic  regulations.  For  example,  if  a  country  decides  to  have full
sovereignty,  this  means  that  it  must  opt  out  of  all  (or  most  of)  binding  international
arrangements.  Its  domestic  economic policy  will  indeed be  entirely  free:  it  may  subsidize
domestic produces freely; conduct any exchange or interest rate policy it likes; impose any level
of tariffs or quantitative barriers; suppress trade unions; not care about environmental regulations
etc. Every movement toward  greater integration will be,  generally, accompanied by some loss
of country's policy-making, regulatory or legal sovereignty (this point is discussed in more detail
below).
s  = -Y  (o)  (3)
where  y  < O.
Substituting (3) in (2), we obtain:
y  - f  [k (y-y(s),D]  = O  (4)
By total differentiation of (4) with respect to y and s, we obtain
'°In the rest of the text,  "capital" will be written without inverted commas. Unless specified
differently,  terms capital and endowments  are used interchangeably.
"However, as openness increases, the importance  of the domestic market for the value of capital
declines.  Thus  kD.O<  0 with kD  = 0 at the  maximum  openness  (o  = o,,,). In other  words, if a country  is fully
open, the size of its domestic market does not matter (vide Hong Kong).7
dy  =fk  k ds
where k, <0  is the derivative  of the value of "capital" with respect to s. Then
dy =  fk k  <  0  (5)
We thus establish that the relationship between sovereignty  and per capita income is
negative. There is a trade-off between the two: increased sovereignty  equals less "openness"
which in turn implies lower value of "capital" and lower per capita income.
The shape of the trade-off  curve will depend on the sign of (6)
d2y  =  k  k  + fkk)  (6)
which will depend on the signs of  fk,  and ks, (we know the signs of the other two
derivatives).  Consider first fk,. The marginal product  of capital  will be a decreasing  function  of
s (see Figure 1, panel a). k.  is also likely to be negative. Figure 1 shows that the value of
capital (on the vertical axis) may be unaffected by some (small) increases  in s; after a certain
point, however, it begins to decline fast. The relationship  is concave and k5,<0. Under this
assumption  small increases  in s, from the position  of full openness, may not matter much, but
later movements  toward autarky become  more and more expensive  in terms of loss of value of
capital and income. 12 Since in the absolute value fk is likely to be the largest term in (6), the
relation would most likely be negative.
'2This  scenario  is also  consistent  with  a view  that  movements  away  from  a very  high  level  of autarky
should  result  in relatively  large  initial  gains  in output.8
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The negative sign of (6) implies a concave transformation  curve of sovereignty  into
income (curve BOB,  curve in Figure 2) and thus decreasing  returns to openness. As the country
moves away from the point autarky Bo in Figure 2, where y=O can be thought of as the
subsistence  income, marginal income gains due to integration  into the world will, at first, be
very high. The marginal gains will gradually decrease  as the country selects  lower s's.9
Figure 2




We have derived the trade-off  curve on the assumption  that is D is given. Consider  now
how the trade-off  curve will be affected  by an increase  in D. The equation (4) becomes
y  - f  [k (y-'(s),D)]  = 0
where bars over s and k denote that they are given. Since  kD > 0 and fk > 0, an increase
in D will increase  y, i.e. expand  the trade-off  curve outwards  for a given s. This means that, for
a given  s, a country with a larger domestic  market (e.g. the US) will be able to achieve  a higher
level of income per capita than a country with a smaller domestic  market (e.g. Canada). The
outward  shift is not uniform though.  Since  kD, > 0  (in virtue of kDo  <  0;  see footnote 10) the curve
expands  more for higher values of s: the trade-off curve shifts from BOB,  to B 2B 1 as in Figure
3. This means that at low levels of openness  the domestic  market is more important  than when
openness  is high. A relatively autarkic  large economy  will be better off that an equally autarkic
small economy. This is why socialism  in one country made some sense for the Soviet Union,
but not for Albania. In the other polar case, of full integration  in the world system,  there is no
reason  to expect  that per capita incomes  of a larger and a smaller country  will be different  (given10
the same endowments).  Thus both curves will intersect  the vertical axis at B, (see Figure 3).
Now, this type of outward shift implies  that the slope of the trade-off curve for a given
yls ratio is less for a larger country (compare the slopes a and b at y*ls*).  In other words,
marginal income gains from integration (or marginal income losses from greater sovereignty)
will be smaller for a larger country.
Figure 3




Finally, consider changing endowments  per person (while keeping D and s constant).
From equation  (4), it directly follows  that an increase  in k will raise income  per person, and the
curve will expand  outwardly  (see Figure 4). But again the expansion  of the trade-off  curve will
not be uniform. As openness increases, the marginal product of capital not only rises," 3 but
rises faster. This can be explained  by the complementarity  that exists between integration  and
endowments  (in particular, between the integration, and technical progress and human capital
which  form the key components  of k). For example, if a country  has abundant  natural resources
or educated labor, it will be better-off than a country without natural resources or with low
'3We  saw  this before:  fk  <  0.11
education  level, even if both choose  full sovereignty.  But the difference  in income will increase
as they integrate  into the world economy:  a country with good endowments  will gain much  more
from integration  than a country with poor endowments.' 4 Thus, B 3-Bo  will be less than B4-B,
(see Figure 4).
The implication  of the uneven  expansion  of the curve is that the slope  of the endowment-
rich country's trade-off curve will be,  for a given yls  ratio, greater than the slope of the
endowment-poor  country. This means that the marginal income gains of integration (or the
marginal costs of sovereignty)  are greater for a country with greater endowments.
Figure 4
Trade-off curve as endowments  increase
Income
B'
BO  B3 Sovereignty
We have thus completed the derivation of the trade-off  curve between sovereignty  and
income. It shows the combinations  of s and y that are available  to a country given its domestic
market size and endowments.  But the issue is: What point on this curve will a country  choose?
We move  to the political  process that guides  this choice, i.e. to the derivation  of the indifference
curves in the s-y space.
'"The  oil-rich  Iraq  may  be worse-off  under  compulsory  autarky  than  Serbia,  but, once  sanctions  are
lifted,  its gain  from integration  will  be much  greater.12
Deriving the indifference curve
Both sovereignty and income can be thought of "goods",  in the sense that citizens and
politicians desire both of more. That sovereignty and income are both  "goods" can be justified
in two ways, depending on whether we take the perspective of politicians or of a representative
citizen. From  the point of view  of economic decision-makers or politicians,  sovereignty is a
"good" because it gives them greater freedom of decision-making, that is greater influence and
power.  It  gives policy-makers  scope for  self-aggrandizement as well as for rent-seeking and
bribery." 5 Increased  GDP  per  capita  is an  objective  for  policy-makers  only  in  so far  as  it
enhances their chances to remain in power. This is true for both democratic or non-democratic
regimes. Now,  from an ordinary individual's  point of view,  the justification is different.  That
his  welfare  would  be  greater  if  average  income  per  capita  is  higher,  is plausible.  But  the
question can be asked: Why would an individual's utility depend on his/her country's  economic
sovereignty?  Sovereignty may be regarded as a "good" by the population because of the value
attached to national pride."6 However,  as before, we can expect that the politicians'  preference
for sovereignty will be greater  (at a given level of income) than the population's.
People's  welfare  is greater  if  their  country  is  more  sovereign  (for  a  given level  of
income), and they have a greater income (for a given level of sovereignty).  Also, the less the
population has of either sovereignty (s) or income (y), the more will it value it at the margin.
'5This, I think, is true regardless  of how corrupt or "honest"  civil servants are. Surely, incorruptible
civil servants will not accept direct bribes. But the absence of externally  binding rules will give them
greater power than they would have otherwise. For example, if tariff rates are not set through some
international agreement, different interest groups will vie with each other over them, as they did
ferociously  during the inter-War  years in Europe  and the US. This will, by definition,  increase  the power
of policy makers-even if we assume that they thereby gain nothing  in terms of income  (i.e. corruption
is excluded). Setting external rules is a way to limit the power of bureaucracy: witness the balanced
budget amendment  in the US, and monetarists' insistence  on monetary policy rules.
'6A friend once told me what a great boost to national  pride of the Chinese  was the nationalization
effected  by the Communists  in 1949.  Many people indeed  gained as foreign  technicians  departed  and the
Chinese  took their positions. But even those who did not gain directly, felt proud that the Chinese  were
able to run the factories as well as foreigners-after a long period of national feeling of inferiority.  A
similar feeling  was present  in other countries: Egypt and India in the 1950's, Cuba in the 1960's etc. In
a poll, a week before the referendum on independence  in Quebec, 77 percent of pro-independence
respondents  said that "'pride in being a Quebecker' influenced  their decision" (The Financial Times,
October 23, 1995, p. 5).13
Thus  we  get  a  standard  indifference  curve  (curve  AA  in  Figure  2)  showing  different
combinations of sovereignty and income which yield an equal welfare.
However, the rates of substitution between income and sovereignty for policy-makers and
the population, as the above discussion makes clear,  differ. Since the likelihood to benefit from
sovereignty is greater for the people who hold power than for those who have none, we posit
that, at every yls ratio along the indifference curve AA,  the rate of substitution of income for
sovereignty is greater (the curve is steeper) the higher the level of political power one has. For
those with no political power and presumably with nothing to gain from greater sovereignty, the
AA curve would become  a  straight line:  only per capita income matters. 17 For the top level
politicians, average per  capita welfare of the population is a constraint that they cannot ignore
if they want to  stay in power,  but the real objective is maximization of their own power  and
welfare which goes hand in hand with increased economic sovereignty, that is economic policy
autonomy.
Now, if we rank all individuals according to their political importance, in the same way
that we rank  them according  to  income in  income distribution curves,  and let them vote on
sovereignty, the more concentrated the political power, the more to the left will be the median
voter," 8 and the  flatter the selected indifference curve.'9 But,  in authoritarian  and dictatorial
regimes, those will low political power will, by definition, be excluded from  "voting."  Thus,
despite the skewness of political power, the selected indifference curve will be-  because of the
truncation of the voting population-  relatively steep. That is, the median "voter" in authoritarian
regimes will want a relatively high sovereignty compared with democracies. We would therefore
expect that authoritarianism and sovereignty will be positively related. 20
'7Obviously,  under the assumption  that the individual  shares in that higher  average  per capita  income.
'8Since  preference  for sovereignty  increases  uniformly  with the level of power, the preferences  are
single-peaked,  and the median voter determines  the outcome;  or said differently, individual  preferences
for sovereignty  can be ranked  by their political power.
'9Obviously,  the mechanism is similar to the choice of lower tax rate in more income unequal
distribution  with full franchise  (see, among  others, Alesina  and Rodrik 1991,  Persson  and Tabellini  1994,
Perotti 1992).
20Thus  Stalin, Hitler or Mao could afford to select high s, but not so Mitterrand  or Major.14
Full-franchise  democratic regimes will display flatter indifference  curve, which with a
given trade-off curve, implies that they would choose a higher equilibrium  y/s ratio. However,
the distribution  of political  power among  the full-franchise  regimes is not always the same. We
can expect  that in regimes where more political  power belongs  to different pressure groups  that
vie for various policies, and where more people are involved in the political process, 2'  (i.e.
where the representative  rather than direct democracy  provides a better approximation  of the
actual political process), the median voter's indifference  curve would be steeper: he/she has
more to gain from sovereignty  than an ordinary voter with no political  power. We can conclude
that -with  a given trade-off  curve-  the highest  yls will be selected  by full-franchise  democratic
regimes with little lobbying or corporatist elements; as power of different organized groups
increases,  the optimal  y/s ratio will decrease.  Finally, authoritarian  regimes or dictatorships  will
select an even lower y/s ratio.
Formalizing  the discussion  so far, we can write:
oAt a given point in time, a country does a constrained  maximization
max  U(y,s)  + X [y-fs,i,]
where U= U(y,s) is a welfare function,  y=f(s,k,D) depicts  the trade-off  curve with given
k and D, and X  gives  the marginal welfare  gain from the relaxation  of the constraint  (via growth
of the domestic  market, or via technological  progress which increases  k).
At the equilibrium, the relation (7) will hold:
R (ys' Z'  k) =  Us  (7)
S  UY
i.e.  the slope of the trade-off curve will be equal to the marginal rate of substitution
between sovereignty and income (and U,=bU/6s  and Uy=bU/by).
2"1  assume  that for a person  to become  involved  in the political  process,  he/she must become  a
member  of an organized  group.15
*Assuming that preferences are homothetic  and taking k as given, a larger country's
equilibrium  will obtain for a lower  yls ratio (see Figure 3). A larger country's equilibrium  will
always  take place at a greater s, but not necessarily  lower  y because its trade-off curve expands
outwards  (compare  points L for a large, and S for a small country  in Figure 3). In other words,
a larger country can achieve a higher income and greater sovereignty.
*As k increases (with a given D) and preferences  are homothetic,  the equilibrium  takes
place for a higher yls  ratio (compare points E2 and El in Figure 4).  While income must
necessarily  be greater in the new  equilibrium,  sovereignty  may go either way, depending  on how
the trade-off curve expands.
The discussion  so far can be encapsulated  in the four following  propositions.
Proposition  1: Negatively  sloped  and concave  trade-off  between income  and sovereignty.
With technological and capital endowments, and the  size of  the domestic market given,
sovereignty  and per capita income are negatively  related. A country  will experience  diminishing
income gains from integration (or increasing  income costs of sovereignty).
Proposition  2: The size-effect.  Larger countries (=larger domestic  market)  can reach a
higher per capita income for a given level of sovereignty  and endowment  (outward  shift of the
trade-off  curve). Their marginal income  gains from integration  will be smaller (less steep  trade-
off curve). If preferences  are homothetic,  larger countries' equilibrium  must obtain for a higher
level of sovereignty.
Proposition 3: Increasing interdependency.  As endowments  increase, marginal income
gains  from integration  increase.  In other words, costs of sovereignty  become  greater as countries
develop  technologically.  Countries  with a higher  k will select, holding  everything  else the same,
higher y/s ratios.
Proposition 4:  Democracy and sovereignty. More democratic countries will tend to
choose  lower levels of sovereignty  because  the population  generally  values sovereignty  less  than
policy-makers.  Conversely, if politicians are more autonomous,  they would be able to choose
(impose?)  higher sovereignty.16
In  order to  test  empirically the relationship, we can write the  ratio between the
equilibrium  sovereignty  (se)  and equilibrium  income  (y*)  as a decreasing  function  of endowments
(k) and democracy  (DEAM)  and an increasing  function of country's domestic  market (D). D and
k determine  the place and the shape  of the trade-off  curve; DEM, the shape of the indifference
curve.
5  Bo + B, k  + B2D  + B3 DEM  (8)
where B, < 0, B2> 0 and B 3< 0. We directly estimate  relation (8) on the 1993-94  cross-
section  of 165  countries  which is practically  all the countries  in the world except  those that were
affected by civil wars and were not functioning as "normal" states (all the republics of the
former Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Burundi, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Somalia). The variables
(whose  unweighted  means, medians, and standard  deviations  are shown  in Table 1) are defined
as follows. 22 y is GDP per capita in  1990 international  prices (the latest year for which the
International  comparison  project data are available).  k is the World Bank  estimate of countries'
per capita  wealth in 1990 US$, taking into account  the value of human  capital, produced  assets,
and natural capital. This is the first ever estimate of this kind. It attempts  to take into accounts
all forms of produced and non-produced  wealth. 23 To give the reader an idea of the range of
estimates, the unweighted mean per capita stock of  wealth is estimated at $86,000 and is
composed  of 64 percent of human capital, 16 percent of produced capital and 20 percent of
natural capital.24  The richest (per capita) countries  are Australia  and Canada with respectively
$835,000 and $704,000; the poorest Ethiopia and Nepal with respectively  $1400 and $1600.
DEM is an estimate of political freedom as calculated  by Freedom  House.25  Its values range
from 1  (fully observed  political  rights) to 7 (entire  absence  of political  rights). Domestic  market,
D,  is obtained as total GDP expressed in  1990 international prices minus net exports of
'All  data are available  from the author on request.
23The  results are reported in Serageldin  (1995, Annex 1).
2'The mean per capita wealth in our sample is somewhat  higher: $ 103,000.
25Reported  in Freedom  House (1994).17
merchandise  and non-factor services.26
Sovereignty  (s) is, of course, the most difficult variable to measure. I measure it as its
reverse: the extent to which domestic economic  policy is constrained  due to membership  in
various  international  organizations  and arrangements.  The memberships  are mostly  memberships
in trade organizations and pacts (e.g. WTO, Mercosur, CEFTA); agreements are to follow
exchange  rate rules: to maintain  a convertible  currency, or to peg it to a foreign currency etc.
If constraints  stemming  from membership  in an international  organization  or arrangement
cover a wide array of policies  or are very binding  on a key economic  variable like the exchange
rate, the membership  constraint is assigned  the value of 3. The only such organization  is the
European  Union; the only foreign  exchange  arrangements  are memberships  in the CFA zone and
Eastern Caribbean  central bank. In the two latter cases, a country  does not have an independent
monetary policy because it lacks national currency."2  If constraints are less binding or affect
a single area like trade but no other areas, the membership  is assigned  the value of 2. Examples
are membership  in WTO or Mercosur, or maintenance  of a pegged  or currency  board exchange
rate system. Finally, being part of an organization  that either has little "bite" over members'
economic  policies, or deals with very limited  economic  issues  results in constraints  being valued
at  1.  Examples include ASEAN membership or  Gulf  cooperation council.  Of  course,
membership  of most international  organizations  places hardly any real constraint on economic
policy-making:  viz. the UN, ILO etc. Membership in these organization therefore does not
matter for economic  sovereignty.
Following  the just explained  procedure, the estimate of how binding  the membership  of
each organization/arrangement  is for its members was made by three international  trade and
exchange  experts, and the estimates were rounded off to the nearest integer. The sum of the
membership constraints (denoted m) is then assigned to  each country in  the sample. For
example, the Netherlands' level of constraint is a high 9 while that of Cuba is 0. The average
2'The  sources  for exports  and  imports  is mostly  IMF's  International  Financial  Statistics,  Annual  issue
for 1994  and  1995;  also World  Bank  Atlas 1994,  1995,  1996;  World  Bank's  Global  Economic  Prospects
and Developing  Countries  1996;  World  Bank's  World  Development  Report 1995  and  1996;  World  Bank's
Statistical  Handbook  of the Former  Soviet Union  for 1994.
27Panama  which  uses  the US dollar  belongs  to the same  group.18
level of weighted  constraint is almost 4, and the standard deviation  2.3 (see Table 1). The full
list  of  international organizations considered, and the estimates of  how  "tight" are  their
membership  requirements  is given in Annex 3.
Table 1. Summary  statistics
Size of  Wealth per capita  Political  Constraint  to
domestic  (k)  repression  economic  policy
market (D)  ($ '000)  (reverse  of DEM)  making (m=
($b at 1990  reverse of s)
international
prices)  l
Mean/median  152.2 / 17.5  103 / 33  3.6 / 3  3.88 / 4
Standard  deviation  518.5  158  2.2  2.3
Simple correlation  coefficients  a/
m/y  -0.07  0.32  -0.26
Domestic  market  0.30  -0.04
(D )  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Wealth (k)  -0.46
a/  y, D, and  k are  expressed  in natural  logs.
The bottom of Table 1 shows  the simple correlation coefficients  between  the variables.
First  note  that the  correlation coefficients between the  dependent variable (membership
constraints  over real per capita income;  m/y) and the RHS variables  have the expected  signs: m/y
is (mildly) negatively correlated with the size of domestic market, negatively with political
repression, and positively with wealth. As discussed earlier, this implies that countries with
larger markets and absence of political liberties will -controlled  for other factors-  choose a
higher sovereignty  to income ratio; countries with larger wealth will, under ceteris paribus
condition, choose a  lower sovereignty  to  income ratio.  The simple correlation coefficients
between  the independent  variables  are relatively  weak, with the exception  of negative  correlation
between per capita wealth and political repression.
The results of  estimation of (8) are  shown in  Table 2.  The dependent variable is
constraints to  economic policy-making over  income per  capita. 28 I  experiment with two
2'Note  that since m is the reverse of s, the expected  signs of the coefficients  will be the reverse of
the signs in equation  (8) with the exception  of DEM that is now also measured  as its reverse.19
formulations  of  the membership  constraint.  The  first,  given  in  equation  1  (Table  2),  is  a
weighted  constraint  where  the  weight attached  to  each  organization  range  from  3 to  1 as
explained  above.  The  second,  in  equation  2,  is  the  unweighted  sum  of  memberships
(1=member,  0=not)  in the selected organizations that do have some binding power  (like the
first definition it excludes organizations that have none). The coefficients in equation 1 have the
predicted signs. However,  lack of political  freedom is not statistically significant;  size of the
domestic market is significant at 5 percent,  and only wealth is significant at 1 percent level. The
interpretation of the coefficients is as follows: doubling of e.g.  per capita wealth increases the
ratio between the weighted membership and (natural log of) per capita income by 0.056. More
concretely,  if  a relatively  poor  country  with  a per  capita  income of  $3000  (at international
prices) and binding constraints of 3,  suddenly discovers oil and doubles its per capita wealth,
its desired level of international integration (=constraint)  will rise to 3.45  without any change
in its per capita income or political  system. 29 Now,  since the ratio m/y  will have to  increase
by the same amount for a given increase in wealth, it implies that counties with a higher initial
per capita income will react by raising their level of m by more than the poorer  countries. In
other  words,  a  given percentage  windfall  increase  in  wealth will  lead  to  a  greater  loss of
sovereignty for the Netherlands than for Zambia.
The  R 2 is 0.15-not  a  bad  result  given  that we  are estimating  an  equilibrium  ratio
between  the cross-sectional  variables.  The equation  is run  with  heteroskedasticity-corrected
standard errors,  and  no  autocorrelation between the  countries,  arranged  in  decreasing  order
according  to  their  GDP  per  capita  at  1990  international prices,  is  detected  (results  of  the
autocorrelation tests are thus not reported). Recursive regressions run for N= 18 onwards show
that  the  coefficients  are  reasonably  stable  (see  Figure  5),  in particular  C(4)  and C(3),  the
coefficients associated respectively with lack of freedom and wealth.
Regression 2 has  a simple sum of binding memberships on the LHS (divided by per
capita income,  of course).  Now,  wealth and lack of political freedom,  with the expected sign
of the coefficients, become much stronger determinants of the m/y ratio; the size of the domestic
market becomes statistically insignificant. R 2 more than doubles.
29The initial  n/In y value was 0.3747. The desired value, after doubling of wealth, will be
0.3747+0.056=0.4307.  This implies m=3.45  (since  y is unchanged).20
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Table 2. Estimation  results
Dependent  variable:
ratio of binding membership  in international  organizations  to GDP per capita
Regression  Constant  Size of  Political repression  Wealth  per  RI
domestic  capita  (SE)
market
1  0.035  - 0.020  -0.015  0.053  0.15
(0.202)  (-2.03)  (1.40)  (3.61)  (0.25)
2  - 0.161  0.004  -0.018  0.048  0.36
t_  (-1.78)  (0.80)  (-3.20)  (5.93)  (0.14)
Note:  OLS regression with White's heteroskedasticity correction.  t-values in parentheses. y, D,  and k in natural logs.
Cross section of 165 countries; years 1993-94.
3. Forming  conglomerates
Let  us  introduce  now  a  "conglomerate".  A  conglomerate  is defined  to be  a large  entity
composed  of a number  of semi-independent  members.  The conglomerate  can be a single country,
like  the former  Soviet  Union,  or the  US,  Canada,  China  or  Spain,  where  well-defined  regional
entities  (republics,  provinces,  states)  have  some  legislative  or executive  power;  or it can  be an
association  of formally  independent  states like the European  Union  or the German  Confederation
(Deutscher  Bund  from  1815  until  1866).  The  conglomerate  will  act  as  a single  entity  when  it
deals  with  foreign  states  or  other  conglomerates.  That  means  that  it must  at  least  be a customs
union.  A  conglomerate  will  normally  be  also  a  free  trade  and  a  single  currency  area.  The
decision-making  in  the conglomerate  can  cover  the  span  of  a virtual  veto  power  held  by  each
member  (e.g.  the US under  the Articles  of Confederation,  United  Provinces  of the Netherlands,
German  Confederation,  Yugoslavia,  the  European  Union  until  the  mid-1980's),  to  different
qualified  majorities  as in  the  United  States30 or weighted  voting  as  currently  in  the  European
Union3",  to unqualified  majority,  or some other  formula  which,  of course,  need  not be formally
3&Three-quarters  of all states and two-thirds of the Senate must agree if the constitution  is to be
amended. Half of the senators will have to agree to pass a law.
3 "Countries' voting rights range from 10 for large countries  to 2 for Luxembourg.  Qualified  majority
is about  71 percent of the voting rights. In addition, for some decisions, 10 out of 15 states must agree.
Finally, for some  decisions,  unanimity  is required. See Hosli (1990).  Disputes  over the qualified  majority22
specified. The Soviet Union,  and the Soviet Union and the Eastern Europe that was within the
CMEA,  where many economic decisions had to be reached through some formal or informal
consensus among the republican Communist party elites,  are examples of the non-formalized
power-sharing. The conglomerate becomes an empire when a single member of the conglomerate
preponderantly  determines  the decisions of  the  conglomerate.  Empires  are  discussed in  the
Annex  1. 32
Two additional things define a conglomerate. Both are supposed to reduce the differences
between  the  members.  The  first  is  the  reduction  in  the  difference  in  power  between the
members. More powerful members (measured by the size of their GDP) may have a somewhat
greater  power in the decision-making. However,  all kinds of checks are placed that limit this
power,  and  make  it less than,  if  instead of  a  conglomerate,  we dealt  with  a  collection  of
independent  states.  In  other  words,  a  decision  to  enter  into a  conglomerate  implies  that  a
redistribution of sovereignty in favor of smaller members. This is present,  for example, in the
European Union where the system of weighted voting is such that the more powerful members
of the conglomerate  are penalized. 33 The U.S.  Senate was "invented"  (since it was indeed a
novelty at the time) to give equal representation to each state and prevent the feared domination
of Virginia.  This was also the case in the Communist conglomerates where the party elites in
lesser members states had  as much or  only slightly less power than the party elites of larger
voting  are currently  pitting UK against Germany.
32 0nce a conglomerate  does not imply  a conglomerate  forever. It can become  an empire, or a nation-
state. For example,  the German  Confederation  and later the Prussia-led  Northern German  Confederation
clearly fitted the description of a conglomerate. The creation of the Second Reich in 1870 could be
viewed  as a formalization  of the conglomerate  wherein  Prussia  was the core member. And, indeed,  like
Russia and Germany  within respectively  the Soviet  Union and the European  Union, Prussia was not the
richest (per capita) member of the conglomerate (Bremen, Hanover and Oldenburg were richer).
However,  by now, the process of unification  has probably  gone far enough  that it would be incorrect  to
describe  the present-day  Germany  as a conglomerate  despite  its federal structure. It would be much  more
accurate to describe it as a nation-state.
33For  example,  Germany  holds 11 percent of the vote, although its population  is 22 percent, and its
GDP 26 percent of European Union's; Luxembourg  holds 2 percent of the vote even if its population  is
less than 1/10 of a percent. The elasticity  of power, measured  by the Shapley-Shubik  index, with respect
to population  was 0.47 for the EU of 12 members (before the latest enlargement).  The elasticity  was
expected to decrease to under 0.4 after the enlargement (see Widgren, 1994). In a different paper
(Widgren, 1994a) Widgren argues that the smaller countries have an even greater relative impact on
policy making  than implied  by their voting rights.23
republics. After 1968, the power in Czechoslovakia was shared very equally between the Slovak
and the Czech parts, although the latter had a population and income twice as large as Slovakia.
Former Yugoslavia had a quota system for federal positions where each republic, regardless of
its population, had an equal number of the nomenklatura slots.
The outcome of this process is that sovereignty of various members is "averaged out."
The more powerful members dissipate some of their sovereignty in favor of the less powerful. 34
The  second  thing that  conglomerates  try  to  equalize  is  the economic  position of  its
members. 35 Conglomerates tend to have income-equalizing policies that transfer income from
richer to poorer members.  Again this is what we observe in numerous instances. The European
Union  transfers  large  amounts of  resources  to  the poorer  members.  The  Soviet Union  and
Yugoslavia had similar policies. Italy which, in some aspects, particularly now with the growth
of the Lega Norde, resembles a conglomerate, has the same policy of transfers to the South. In
the U.S.,  the explicit policy does  not exist, but  similar considerations are taken into account
through the bargaining for federal funds.
Let us now look at the conglomerate's equilibrium. Suppose that a conglomerate consists
of  a  large  core  country  with  a  level  of  income  approximately  the  same  as  that  of  the
conglomerate as a whole (so that the core country does not subsidize poorer members), and of
one small rich, and one small poor members.36  This parallels the situation in the Soviet Union,
Yugoslavia,  or  the  European  Union,  where  the  small  rich  member  can  be  thought  of  as
respectively Estonia, Slovenia or Luxembourg; a small poor member as Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia
and Greece, while the core member has an income close to the group average (Russia, Serbia
340ne possible reason why they might do so is suggested by Hirschleifer's (1991) "paradox of
power". The weaker  side (a state, in this case) receives a higher  pay-off from engaging  in conflictual  or
redistributive  activity compared to the productive  activity than the stronger side. The weaker side will
therefore fight harder and more frequently  than the richer side-unless the importance  of the conflict  is
sufficiently  high for the stronger side to shift the use of its resources towards conflict. If this happens,
however, the basic cooperation  on which a conglomerate  is built is done away with and the conglomerate
is doomed. But, in "normal life" of conglomerates,  the weak will fight harder.
35Now  it could well be that the two redistributions:  of sovereignty  and income  must necessarily  go
together because  income redistribution  is not feasible without  redistribution  of political power.
36The  small rich member has greater k than the small poor member.24
and Germany).
The trade-off curves and the equilibrium positions of the members before they join the
conglomerate are shown (by broken  lines) in Figure 6.  The equilibria  obtain at points R (for
rich), P (for poor) and C (for core) member. Note how the trade-off curves are drawn: the rich
member has  a  high k  reflected  in the  fact that  for  s=O,  it can  reach the highest income."
However,  because its domestic market is small,  the trade-off curve drops down more quickly
than the trade-off curve of the core member.
The trade-off curve for the conglomerate as a whole is obtained as a weighted sum of the
individual trade-off  curves,  where,  for simplicity, we suppose that the total GDP of the core
member  is twice as large  as the  GDPs of the smaller  members. 38 In addition,  the trade-off
curve expands because of the increased size of the  "domestic" market  (free trade  area),  and
becomes flatter  (see  Proposition  2).39 This  expansion,  which I  will call  "income  gain from
amalgamation",  can be seen by comparing the two solid lines in Figure 6. The curve BOBO  is a
simple summation  of the members'  trade-off  curves.  The curve BOB,  is the expanded curve
where, in accordance with the discussion in Section II, the expansion is greater for higher levels
of s. The conglomerate's  equilibrium obtains at K. Assuming for the moment that members fully
share both income and sovereignty, each member's  equilibrium will be at K.
Consider first what happens to sovereignty in the new equilibrium.  If sovereignty of all
members is the same (s, in Figure 6), smaller members will have gained in sovereignty and the
"The opposite  holds for the small poor member.
38That  assumes  that the small rich member must have lower population  that the small  poor member.
39As a noted analyst of European integration  (Jacquemin, 1995, p.6) observed: "The establishment
of the European  community  and its implementation  of common  policies  are a partial response  to [danger
of lack  of cooperation  between  the states]:  competition  can  be preserved  while  at the same  time economies
of scale  are possible and external  benefits  can be internalized.  An illustration  of the impact  of the Union
as a European regional grouping and of the resultant pooling of sovereignty  is that the protectionist
instruments  of national  trade policies have been replaced  by shared competition  rules." Another  gain of
amalgamation  emphasized  by Alesina,  Perotti and Spolaore  (1995) is lower per capita cost of providing
public services and lower cost of insurance  against unforeseeable  income declines.25
core member lost." 0 However,  while sovereignty must be somewhat evened out,  it need not be
entirely  equalized.  It  could  well  be  that  within  the  conglomerate  there  is  some  further
redistribution  of  power  that  leaves  the larger  member  with  sovereignty  s, whereas  smaller
members'  sovereignty  is less.  One  can think  of  this  in  the  following terms.  While  for  all
members of the conglomerate  international agreements that limit sovereignty to the point s, are
binding,  the conglomerate might  impose additional constraints on some of its members.  For
instance, the conglomerate  might accept some international labor legislation rules,  but opt out
of compulsory minimum wage legislation. Yet some members of the conglomerate might have
a binding minimum wage legislation. In conclusion, no member of the conglomerate may have
sovereignty greater than sl, but  some might have s < sl. Larger members of the conglomerate,
like Russia in the case of the USSR, might strongly influence economic policy of other members
and reduce their s. Examples include the creation of the virtual mono-cultural economies like
Uzbekistan (cotton), or "assignment" of computer-development specialization to Bulgaria within
the CMEA zone."  In the extreme case, when a conglomerate  "degenerates" into empire,  only
the core member will have sovereignty s,,  while all others'  sovereignty will be close to 0 (see
Annex 1).
'"The  exact equilibrium  will depend  on the slopes  of the members' trade-off  curves. If rich member's
slope is very steep (as shown in Figure 5), the BOBO  curve may drop quickly. But then if the gain from
amalgamation  is large, the BOB,  can substantially  expand  outward.
4 "Romania under Ceausescu  selected  a very high degree of sovereignty  to the detriment  of per capita
income  (going  as far as letting  the U.S. most-favored  nation  status be revoked),  and refused  to accept  the
"assignment"  of food and energy  producer within  the CMEA.  It might, however, become  just that within
the European  Union.26
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As for conglomerate's equilibrium income, it will also lie somewhere between the
equilibrium  incomes  of the individual  members  when they were independent  (see y, Figure 6).42
Because  the conglomerate,  through  redistribution, selects  the same income for all its members,
chances are that the rich small member might lose in terms of income while the poor small
member will definitely gain. As mentioned  above, the assumption  of the same income for all
members is made only for the sake of convenience.  Incomes will not be equalized  in real life.
The point, however, is that there would be some redistribution  from the richer to the poorer
members. In theory, even the rich member might gain in terms of income, if the outward shift
of the curve more than offsets the redistribution,  or, alternatively,  if redistribution  is relatively
small (i.e. incomes between the members are not fully equalized).
" 2The conglomerate's  equilibrium  income  may,  theoretically,  be higher  than  the initial  equilibrium
income  of each  member  if the trade-off  curve,  thanks  to the gains  from  amalgamation,  expands  a lot.27
What is then the outcome for the individual members? Sovereignty will expand for the
smaller (both rich and poor) members who, on account of their small size, had low sovereignty
before they joined  the conglomerate.  Income will  increase for  the poor  small member  who
benefits both from larger market and redistribution; it might go either way for the core member;
and will most likely decrease for the rich small member.
Why would then states decide to join (or to stay) in a conglomerate? The answer for a
small poor member is obvious: it gains on both fronts,  income and sovereignty. 43
The core member's  position is unclear because the new equilibrium might in tenns  of
both income and sovereignty go either way. However, to offset possible losses, the core member
might "collect" some "psychic or political" income since it is the leader of a collection of states.
This  can  be  called  "the  core  member  effect".'  Core  member's  international  importance
increases. For example, if the West is viewed as a conglomerate, then the US can be considered
the core member.  Clearly, the US has, since 1941, collected some "psychic" income from being
"the leader of the free world" and was willing to sacrifice pure economic gains to achieve this
status (by, inter alia, providing an almost free defense umbrella for Western Europe and Japan).
The  real  difficult  choice  belongs  to  the  small  rich  member.  It  would  stay  in  the
conglomerate only  if  the gain in  sovereignty more  than offsets an  almost certain decline in
income. The rich member is, therefore, the least stable member of the conglomerate. It will have
a strong incentive to limit redistribution. 45 Other members will then have an incentive to accede
to  its demand  if they  wish to  preserve the  conglomerate  intact.  They might  prefer to  limit
redistribution to the point where the rich member's  income remains sufficiently large to let it
43Vaubel  (1994) finds that the popularity of European integration (the share of the country's
population that favors tighter integration)  rises with country's received net per capita transfers and
declines  with the increase in its GDP per capita. Both variables  are highly significant.  "Popularity  of the
union" is measured  at discrete time intervals covering the period between 1962 and 1992.
44Vaubel  (1994, p. 1777)  finds that larger countries, measured  by the population,  tend to be more in
favor of European  integration  and centralization.
45Tullock  (1993, p.21) makes  the same  point with respect  to nation-state  that I make with respect to
the conglomerate:  "You might say that the definition  of the nation-state  is the area within  which there is
redistribution.  And the strongest argument [from the US perspective]  I know for not having a world
government  is what would happen to our incomes if we had a world government".28
reach a higher indifference curve (than if independent). Smaller redistribution will not be in the
interest of the poor member, but it has nowhere to go: even small redistribution combined with
greater sovereignty makes it better-off  in the conglomerate than independent. Figure 7 shows
such a stable equilibrium.  The trade-off curve is the same as in Figure 6. The equilibrium s1 is
(for simplicity) equal for all members.  But income is not equalized. Yet each member's  new
equilibrium  at respectively Pk, Rk  and Ck is preferable to its pre-conglomerate equilibrium at
respectively P,  R and C.  Even the rich member touches now a higher indifference curve than
before when it was independent. 46 The core member must  gain some income since it loses in
sovereignty."  The core member will be more easily satisfied with the new equilibrium if it is
democratic because its income gain will then more easily compensate for the loss of sovereignty
(its indifference curves would be fairly flat). Finally, the small poor member in Figure 7 has still
moved in the NE direction, gaining both in terms of y and s.
Figure  7






'Obviously the weighted  sum of new equilibrium  incomes  associated  with Rk,  Ck and Pk, cannot  be
greater than the sum of incomes from Figure 5 (since Figure 6 shows only a redistribution  of the
conglomerate's  total income). A more formal discussion of the conglomerate's equilibrium is in the
Annex  2.
47Unless,  of course, the "core member effect" compensates  for all the losses in s and y.29
Both  income and sovereignty are  "traded" within the conglomerate.  We have already
noted that the core member  may command somewhat greater sovereignty than the rest. But a
small rich member may also be  "granted" greater  sovereignty (than the average sovereignty of
the conglomerate) in order to keep it in the union. Lessening redistribution and/or giving greater
sovereignty consequently appear as the two instruments for keeping the potentially least stable
member of the conglomerate (the small rich member) in. This is why we may expect that natural
resource-rich provinces in various countries (e.g.  Russia,  Indonesia, China 48, the Philippines)
will try to strike bilateral  deals with the rest of the conglomerate setting both the limits to the
extent of redistribution and obtaining greater sovereignty.
We can summarize our discussion of the conglomerate in two propositions.
Proposition  5.  Poor  members  will  stay  in  or  try  to  join.  Poor  small  members of  a
conglomerate will not have an incentive to break away from the conglomerate.
Proposition  6. Rich members might want to leave or may not care to  join. Rich small
members might have an incentive to break away if, through redistribution between the members,
they lose sufficient amount of income.
Formalizing willingness to join.
Equation (8) has defined the equilibrium ratio of sovereignty to income.  Low sly ratio,
however,  can be  achieved in two different  ways: a country may be heavily  integrated in the
world trade system without being a member of a conglomerate (e.g.  Switzerland) or it may join
a conglomerate (e.g.  the Netherlands).
Thus, knowing that a country has selected a given sly ratio does not tell us whether it is
likely to have joined  or not  a conglomerate.  We need to complement  equation (8) with that
48Rich  Chinese  provinces  are loath to remit their portion of tax payments  to the center. A prominent
Chinese economist  has recently (see "China 'risking collapse' from fiscal weaknesses",  The Financial
Times,  June 16, 1995)  compared  this attitude  to the situation  in the former Yugoslavia  before  the break-
up. And indeed throughout its existence Yugoslav federal authorities never succeeded in receiving
corporate  and wage income  tax, the two largest  tax sources, which  remained  with the republics.  The same
breakdown  in payments  occurred  in the Soviet  Union  just before  the  collapse  (see Bird, Ebel and Wallich,
1995,  p.324).30
expressing  willingness  to join a conglomerate.  Willingness  to join will be a positive  function of
relative poverty, i.e. poverty relative to the potential conglomerate a country seeks to join. For
example, if the Eastern European  countries  had only a choice of joining Asian conglomerates,
where they would not be "poor", they would most likely decline. But since the conglomerate
they wish to join (the EU) is richer than they, they are eager to join.
Democratic  countries will also be more likely to join because they tend (in contrast to
non-democracies)  to emphasize  economic  gains  (see Proposition  4), and the economic  gains  from
amalgamation  are always positive.
Country  size is ambiguous.  Willingness  to join may  be high both for very small and very
large countries. Small countries will have low equilibrium s  when independent. Joining a
conglomerate  is likely to increase it due to conglomerate's sovereignty-sharing  features. But as
GDP  increases and country's  trade-off curve expands outwards, its  equilibrium s  when
independent  will increase, and it might then lose some s when  it joins a conglomerate.  The
willingness to join will decrease. 49 However, for a  very large country, becoming a  core
member-to  which it will normally  aspire-will  bring some "psychic"  gain of leadership.  Thus,
very large countries may wish to join conglomerates-indeed as core rather than as ordinary
members.
Willingness  to join a conglomerate  (W) for a country i can then be written:
W1= Bo + B,  _  + B 2 DEMi  +  '  (GDP,)  (9)
where B 1 < 0, B 2> 0, yi/y is i-th country's income level  relative  to the "target"  group, and
,(GDP) a quadratic (U-shaped)  function (willingness  to join is high for both small and large
GDP countries).
The most eager to join  conglomerates would be poor,  small, and democratic countries
"We  take economic gain or loss from joining a conglomerate  as given since it does not depend  on
total GDP but on GDP per capita.31
(e.g. Eastern Europe, Sri Lanka) where all three elements combine to make membership in
conglomerates  a desirable option. Large, rich and democratic  countries (e.g. the US) will join
conglomerates  as core members. The least likely to join conglomerates  would be rich non-
democratic  countries  with intermediate  size of GDP (e.g. Saudi  Arabia). When independent  they
can maintain a relatively high s, while-if  they were to join a conglomerate-they would be
unable to claim the core function that normally goes to large countries  only. Moreover, since
they are rich, they are likely to lose income through redistribution.  Large, and non-democratic
countries  are most likely  to try to transform  conglomerates  into empires."5  This is because  their
rulers value sovereignty  highly. Joining  a conglomerate  for economic  gain  does not matter much
to them. Joining a conglomerate  even as a core member  may entail some loss of sovereignty.
The only interesting  proposition  for them is thus a conglomerate  which is transformed  into an
empire. Otherwise,  they might prefer to remain aloof from any kind of integration.
We estimate equation (9) on the same sample of 165 countries. First each country is
"assigned"  to its geographical  group. There are eight such groups: Europe, Central Asia, South
East Asia and the Pacific, Africa, Middle East, North America, Central America, and South
America. The country's relative's income is expressed  as the ratio of country's GDP per capita
and average  (unweighted)  GDP per capita  of the group (both  at international  prices). Willingness
to join is a binary variable where countries  that are members  of the European Union 5",  Nafta,
ASEAN, CARICOM,  Mercosur, or CIS customs  union are assigned  a value of 1; if a country
is not a member  of any of the above organizations  it is assigned  a value of zero (there are 112
such zeros). This implicitly  supposes  that "willingness"  to join is indeed satisfied: if a country
wants to join an organization, it will (or at least it would  have applied). The results of the logit
regression  are shown in Table 3. The signs of all the coefficients  are as predicted.  All but one
are significant at least at 5 percent level. Democracy is particularly strongly significant: the
increase  in political repression  of 1 Freedom House point2 reduces the ratio of odds of joining
vs. not joining a conglomerate  by 65 percent. The average level of political repression  among
member  countries is 2.3; among non-members,  it is 4.3 (see Table 3). Also, as expected,  the
willingness to join is U shaped: it is the highest for countries with small and large GDPs.
50This  applies  whether  they  are rich or poor.
5 "0r have  officially  applied  to join  the  European  Union:  Malta,  Cyprus,  Turkey,  Hungary  and  Poland.
52Remember  that  DEM is measured  as its reverse:  1 is full political  rights,  7 none.32
However, the relative  income  does not matter. It is, in effect, slightly  higher for members  (1.15)
than for non-members  (0.94). This may be due to the fact that none of the conglomerates  (free
trade areas) included  here except the European Union does have redistribution.
Table 3. Estimation  results
Dependent  variable:  membership  in a free trade association  a/
Constant  Relative  Political  GDP b/  Squared  Log
income  repression  GDP  b/  likelihood
5.04  - 0.036  - 0.465  - 1.222  0.076  -80.38
(1.76)  (-0.13)  (-4.32)  (-1.99)  (2.38)
Average  values  of independent  variables
Among  members  1.15  2.30  $37.4b  l  _l
Among non-  0.94  4.28  $12.5b
members
Note:  Logit regression; t-values in parentheses. Cross section of  165 countries; years 1993-94. GDP and
squared GDP in natural logs.
a/ One of the following organizations:  European Union, Nafta, ASEAN, CARICOM, Mercosur, or CIS  customs
union.  b/ At 1990 international prices.
4. When  will conglomerates  become  unstable?
The equilibrium  analysis of the conglomerate  leads us naturally to the next question:
when might conglomerates  become  unstable?  The answers  are straightforward.
(1) When there is too much redistribution. This might prompt the richer members  to
leave.
(2) When the core member is richer than the average, so that it too begins to subsidize
the poorer members. This will be particularly destabilizing  because the conglomerate  might
survive if it loses a small rich member  but is unlikely  to survive the loss of its core member.33
(3) A conglomerate  will become particularly unstable if  its small richer members can
envisage shifting from the current conglomerate to a different one where they would be small
poor members, i.e.  where they would gain from redistribution instead of losing.
Indeed, each of these three scenarios is what we have been witnessing in the recent events
in Europe. Consider the following facts. First,  the most committed members to the preservation
of the conglomerates that have broken up (the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia) were the
poorer  members:  the  Central  Asian  republics  in  the  USSR, 53 Macedonia,  Bosnia,  and
Montenegro  in  Yugoslavia.  Second,  the  rich  members  often expressed  annoyance  with  the
amount of transfers  that they had to make to the poorer members  (e.g.  Slovenia,  the Czech
republic).  Slovenia's  parties  explicitly  campaigned  for  independence because  of  (what  they
perceived to be) high transfers.  The same issue is the driving force of the Italian Lega Norde
which had become the largest political party in Northern Italy. Lega furthermore argues for the
federalization of Italy,  which could ultimately pave the way for the break-up of the country.
Third, the core members gradually became disenchanted with the conglomerates and effectively
destroyed them (together with the small rich members). Russia became a heavy loser in terms
of  income,  as  it  subsidized  most  of  other  republics.5"  Expressing  this  "core  member
disenchantment", now projected back to the 19th century, Solzhenitsyn (1995, p.38) writes about
Alexander I empire-building: "[Alexander I] hopelessly infected with "beautiful ideas", and not
seeing, if only through Austria's  example, how harmful it is for the dominant nation in a state
to create a multiethnic empire... demanded that Russia receive the central  region of a further
rapartitioned Poland."
Finally, and probably most importantly, the whole process of disintegration was speeded
up  by  the geographic  proximity  of  a  richer  conglomerate  (the  European  Union)  to  whose
membership the small rich states of the Eastern conglomerates aspired. In the European Union
they would become small poor states, and would receive subsidies. Moreover,  they -probably
correctly-assumed  that their chances of joining the EU were greater  as individual states than
together with the rest of the old conglomerate. It is obviously easier for the rich conglomerate
53Witness  the insistence with which Kazakhstan's president  Nuzerbaev still champions  the idea of
Eurasian  economic  union. Kazakhstan,  Belarus and Kyrghyzstan  have  joined in a customns  union with
Russia. In November 1995, Uzbekistan  and Tajikistan  also formally agreed to join.
54See  Tarr (1994), Orlowski  (1995).34
like the EU to accept the three Baltic countries (with a combined  population  less than Paris's)
than the whole of the Soviet Union.
The rich conglomerates  tend to attract, like a force of gravity, poorer members  whether
these are independent  states or members  of another  conglomerate.  In the latter case, centrifugal
forces in the poorer conglomerate  are set in force. For example, the Common  Market in Latin
America  may  be doomed  simply because  richer Latin countries  may not wish to join, preferring
instead  to become  NAFTA members. Chile is reported to be much more interested  in NAFTA
membership than in Mercosur. 55 It is very difficult to  organize any type of economic co-
operation among  East European states: the lure of the EU is too strong. The same is true for
Arab Mediterranean  countries. Finally, in Asia, ASEAN had become attractive to Vietnam
(which  just joined), Laos and Burma.
But the rich conglomerates  will have much more trouble attracting countries that are
richer than the conglomerate  average. Switzerland  and Norway  refused to join the Union (or the
European  Economic  Area). Although  they would gain  from being in the Union as their trade-off
curves would shift out, they could lose more from paying net subsidies  to the poor members.
Popularity of the Union in another two rich countries, Sweden and Denmark, is low: the
electorate  is evenly split between membership  and non-membership.
The difference in the position of the rich and poor small members  of the conglomerate
leads  us to answer  our original question, namely the apparent  inconsistency  between the clamor
for greater sovereignty with which some states justified their secession and their desire to
dissipate  that sovereignty  by joining the European Union. The contradiction  between the two
stances  is obvious from the two popular slogans at the time: "return to Europe" and "national
sovereignty."  The former excluded  the latter.
As the analysis  shows,  the equilibrium  sovereignty  level of these  states, particularly  when
they become democratic and  the  population strongly prefers high  income compared to
sovereignty, is bound to be small whether they are independent  countries or members of a
conglomerate.  The key gain  from independence  is not sovereignty,  but the ability to switch  from
"See Nancy  Dunne,  "Chile's  patience  wearing  thin over  Nafta"  in Financial  Times,  June 13, 1995,
p. 7.35
a poor to a rich conglomerate.
In the meantime, some countries are in a peculiar limbo state. For the countries that were
part  of  the  FSU  in  particular,  the break-up  of  the  Soviet conglomerate  meant  a  dramatic
downward shift in the trade-off curve as their markets shrank. 56 Their sovereignty, by default,
became high since they were parties to very few international agreements. (The situation was
different for Russia, not solely because of its size, but because it officially became the successor
of the Soviet Union.) The shift which occurred for the smaller republics after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union can be represented by a movement from point A to point B in Figure 8, where
the shrinking of the trade-off curve is shown by comparing EAE 0 (the republic's  trade-off curve
when it was part of the conglomerate) and EoE, (when independent). Their sovereignty increased
by default as income went down. However, as these countries become better integrated into the
world economy, and eventually join the EU, their equilibrium y and s will move in the North-
Westerly direction,  indicated by the arrow,  towards the position of low sovereignty and high
income.
56The  reverse of the gain of amalgamation.36
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5. Some other issues.
The most stable conglomerates  will be those where income levels of the members are
similar and members are approximately  of the same size (in terms of GDP). In that case, all
members  gain in income  (because  redistribution  is small, and they gain  from amalgamation),  and
may gain even in terms of sovereignty  because,  being small, they would, as independent  states,
have to choose equilibria with a low s. These facts might explain the stability of the U.S.
conglomerate.  For example, Arkansas  certainly  economically  gains  from being a member  of the
Union. Although  its sovereignty  is very limited, it would  not be much different  if Arkansas  were
independent  because, as a small country, it would probably have to  choose a low level of
sovereignty  in order to reach high income. Also, the size of the U.S. member  states is such that
the core state is much smaller than in most other conglomerates.  For example, the largest state
(in terms of GDP), California, contributes  only 13 percent of the US GDP. But Russia in the
former Soviet Union accounted  for more than 60 percent of GDP, and within the CMEA for37
more than 40 percent.  Serbia accounted for 40 percent of Yugoslavia's GDP. Germany accounts
for 26 percent of the European Union GDP. Also, the US states are fairly homogeneous in terms
of per capita income. In the US, less than 1/5 of the overall income inequality (measured by the
Gini coefficient) is due to the differences in the average per capita incomes between the states;
the corresponding percentages are more than a third in Mexico, Brazil and the former Soviet
Union. In addition, inter-state income inequality, already low, decreased by half between 1950
and  1989.58
An interesting and revealing case is that of Quebec and the rest of Canada. The emphasis
that the Quebecois leaders  put on  the fact  (hope?) that Quebec,  even if  independent, would
remain a party to all international economic agreements signed by Canada, including the use of
the Canadian dollar,  shows that they are quite aware of the trade-off between sovereignty and
income. They fear that independence might bring about a decline of income during the period
until Quebec becomes fully reintegrated into the world economy (akin to what happened to the
former  Soviet  republics  depicted  in  Figure  8).  But  this  point  also  highlights  the  apparent
inconsistency of their position: Quebec's  sovereignty as independent state would be no greater
than is its current sovereignty as a province of Canada."  Even in terms of income, the best it
can expect is simply to be where it is now.  It is then unclear what the point of independence
is.60
The analysis also throws light on the European Union and its process of enlargement.
While the poor countries outside the EU wish to join,  the poor countries inside the EU wish to
keep the outsiders out.  Thus, Mr. Westendorp,  Spain's  minister for European affairs, warned
58Measured  by using per capita personal  income for 51 states (inclusive of D.C.). See Ram (1992,
p.41). The results are very similar if one uses the break-down  of the Gini coefficient.  Writing the overall
US size income  inequality  as 100 percent, differences  is the average  per capita  income  between  the states
explained  27 percent of inequality  in 1950 and 1960, 21 percent in 1970, and 19 percent in 1980.
5Bihr (1995, p. 6) in a very careful study of Quebec independence  movements  writes: "To believe
that Quebec  will manage  to deal  more successfully  with the  big Southern  neighbor  [the  United  States]  than
with the rest of Canada is an illusion stemming  from the depth of historical  misunderstandings  between
Canada  and Quebec.  This also means  to forget  a consistent  US attitude,  derived  from its power, to subject
any political  or economic  agreement  to its own national  interests. If, in contrast  to the US "lion", Canada
and Mexico are but "sheep", an independent  Quebec  would not be but a "lamb." [my translation].
60 This is not to deny the importance  of an obvious  gratification  that many  people feel in having  their
own flag, anthem, national  soccer team etc.38
that  "many EU countries would be unlikely to ratify the Union treaty changes if they were to
lose their EU subsidies to the East".61
The core state plays a key role in a conglomerate. As long as the core state sticks with
the conglomerate,  the conglomerate has a chance to survive.  Even if the richest countries in
Europe were not to join  the Union (or to leave it), so long as Germany and (to some extent)
France remain in the Union, it will continue. Similarly, had Russia willed to continue the Union,
the departure of the Baltics would not have destroyed it. There was certainly a sufficiently strong
support for the Union in the Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Belarus, while Ukraine was, at most,
divided. 62 Similarly,  had not  Serbia, together  with  Slovenia, started to destroy  the Yugoslav
federation, it could have survived.
For the European Union this underscores the key role played by Germany.  As the core
country,  it is a  net loser  in  terms of  sovereignty. 63 But if  Germany's  economic gains  from
integration become eroded through redistribution (because Germany like Russia is in the position
of a core net-contributor' M), it might gradually become disenchanted with the Union. Germany's
drive to  "broaden" the European Union relatively fast by bringing in East European states is
therefore  an ambivalent move.  On the one hand,  Germany would lose since it is the largest
subsidy-giver, and all of these countries will be net recipients of subsidies. 65 On the other hand,
Germany hopes that its political clout within the Union would increase because these countries
can be expected to vote with Germany as a bloc. Its political stature would increase and it could
6 "Quoted from "For Spain, the EU is all about  money", International  Herald  Tribune,  July 10, 1995,
p.13.
62The referendum for the preservation of the Union held in March 1991 returned an almost 100
percent vote in favor in Central Asia and Azarbaijan,  83 percent in Belarus,  74 percent in Ukraine, and
71 percent in Russia. The referendum was boycotted in the Baltic republics, Armenia, Georgia and
Moldova.
63It was not the case in the past when Germany,  because  of the lost war, had anyway  its sovereignty
severely  curtailed. But that sovereignty  loss was due to elements  exogenous  to our analysis.
64 'n  1992, Germany's net budget contribution  to the EU was 9 billion ECU. France was a distant
second with a net contribution  of 1  1/2  ECU.
65But,  note also that Germany's  trade-off  curve might expand  quite a lot (much  more than that of its
other EU partners)  because  of East Europeans'  high demand  for German  exports. This is the case of the
different gains from amalgamation  for different members  (see Annex 2).39
collect the "psychic" income associated with the leader, but at economic cost to its population.
Finally, the analysis  also highlights  the extremely  sensitive  role of income  redistribution.
For a conglomerate  to be stable, income differences  between members  need to be minimized.
This explains why all conglomerates  engage in redistributive  policies. But, on the other hand,
too much redistribution  may drive away the rich members  of the conglomerate,  and endanger
conglomerate's  existence. Thus, redistribution  is, on one hand, needed for the conglomerate's
long-term survival; on the other hand, it might make the conglomerate  less stable in the short-
term.
6. A summary  of hvvotheses. results  and agenda for further research
In this paper, we have been able to generate a  set of relatively clear and testable
hypotheses.  Most of them were tested in the paper. This is their summnary.
(1) Controlling for endowments,  we expect to find larger countries (in terms of their
domestic  market)  selecting  higher levels of sovereignty  (s). The empirical  analysis,  based on 165
countries in 1993-94,  confirms this.
(2) As endowments  increase, we would expect costs of sovereignty  to go up because
endowments  cannot be "valorized" in isolation. Thus we expect lower s, i.e.  an increase in
binding international  agreements,  with time (as the countries  of the world get richer). Cross-
sectionally,  we expect lower s as endowments  increase. This is indeed  the case: greater wealth
per capita is strongly  associated  with countries' acceptance  of binding international  agreements.
(3) More democratic  countries  will, under ceteris  paribus conditions  (i.e. given domestic
market, endowments),  select lower s. We find some evidence for this too.
(4)  Conglomerates will  be  particularly attractive for  small  and  poor  members.
Conglomerates  will have trouble attracting or holding small rich members. We can expect that
the richest countries  either leave  the conglomerates  or fail to join them. We find strong  evidence
that small countries tend to join the conglomerates. However, no evidence is detected that40
relative income (i.e. country's income relative to the average  income  of the "aspiration"  group)
matters for the decision to join a conglomerate.
(5) Democracies  will be more likely  to form and join conglomerates.  The evidence for
this is very strong. A one "Freedom House point" increase  in political repression  reduces  the
odds of joining vs. not joining by almost 2/3.
(6) Large non-democracies  will tend to transform conglomerates  into empires (in order
to increase  rulers' sovereignty)  or to stay out. Rich, middle-sized  and non-democratic  countries
will stay out. We did not test the first statement. As for the second, we find support for the
tendency  of middle-sized  and non-democratic  countries  to stay out; not so for the rich.
The following  two hypotheses  were not tested. They might provide topics for further
research, in which the issue of conglomerate  stability may be at the center stage.
(7) Conglomerates  will be stable if composed of countries at about the same level of
income (thus limiting the redistribution),  and of similar sizes (thus all gaining from a larger s
that comes with the conglomerate).  For stability to obtain, richer and/or larger members  will
have to  have somewhat greater sovereignty (to be  "more equal") than poorer and smaller
members. Giving them greater sovereignty is a  "bribe" to  make richer members accept
redistribution,  and larger members  not to strike it out by themselves.
(8) Rich conglomerates  will particularly  strongly  attract small rich members  of the poor
conglomerates,  who can thus move from being net-subsidy  donors to net recipients.41
ANNEX  1
Why conglomerates  are not empires?
One of the obvious questions is what distinguished conglomerates from empires.  First,
empires are run predominantly or entirely by a single member state. Although  its domination
is seldom complete over  all  spheres of decision-making,  there  is never doubt of  who is the
master nation of the empire. Sovereignty of that member is much greater than sovereignty of any
other  member. '  This  is  different  from  the  conglomerates  where,  as  we  have  argued,
sovereignty is shared, and moreover where the dominant (core) member almost invariably "gives
up" more of its sovereignty than the other members. Secondly, and related to the previous point,
empires do not have redistribution policies in favor  of weaker members.  They are run by the
dominant member and primarily in the interest of the dominant member.
An important difference emerges  in the shape of the sovereignty-income  relationship.
Empires,  unlike  conglomerates  or  single  nation-states,  do  not  face  a  trade-off  between
sovereignty and income.  Rather the reverse. Control over the others  is often the condition for
the rising income.  As shown in Figure  LA, for empires both sovereignty and income increase
for a while. For the population of the dominant state, this is an ideal situation because it can
quickly move up the indifference curve: it can avail both of greater  sovereignty (mastery over
the others) and greater income. However,  a point is reached when the maintenance of a given
level of sovereignty or its increase requires military or police expenses of a magnitude such that
any income gain from the acquisition of new territories and population is more than offset by
increased expenses. At that point (see point A in Figure 1A), empires do begin to face the trade-
off between sovereignty and income.
66Doyle  (1986, p. 12)  defines  an enpire as "a system of interaction  between  two political  entities,  one
of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external policy-the
effective  sovereignty-of the other, the subordinate  periphery."42
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The conglomerate's  equilibrium per capita income Yk* is likely to be greater 67 than the
weighted average income of the members before they joined the conglomerate y 1* (equation Al).
a  (21)  is the income gain from amalgamation.
T*  = (x  Epi  Y  (Al)
where pi=the  share in total population.
The conglomerate's  average income Yk*  is, by definition, equal to the weighted mean of
67We  cannot be sure that it will be greater despite the expansion  of the trade-off  curve because  the
conglomerate's  level of sovereignty changes compared to what was individual  members' sovereignty
before.43
members' incomes,  yik  for all i (see equation  A2). If there is full redistribution  so that members'
incomes are equalized: yk =yik.  In a more general case when there is some redistribution but not
full equality of  incomes, a  member's equilibrium income will be  yk*=ctdiyi.  di's are the
distribution  parameters. di's are greater for poorer members. If d,>0,  a member gains from
redistribution.  In order for the conglomerate  to be stable, di for the rich member must be so
calibrated  to allow it to reach a higher indifference  curve than if it were independent.
Yk  - y  P, Yi  =  SP.iy7  di Yi(A2)
As can be seen from (9), in principle, each member gains from amalgamation. 68 But
depending  on the redistribution  parameter  d, a member's income  may be additionally  increased
or  reduced. There are  thus two key parameters: the  gain from  integration, et,  and the
redistribution of income within the conglomerate  (d.). Obviously, the greater the gain from
integration (the "freebie"), the easier is to negotiate  the distribution  parameters such that the
members,  including  the rich one (whose  d < 0), would  have an income  sufficiently  high to reach
a higher indifference  curve when within the conglomerate  than independent.
'In  the general  case  a may  be member-specific:  aci  aj  ￿a.44
ANNEX 3
International organizations and agreements used in calculation of
constrained economic policy sovereignty
Name of organization  Description of constraints to sovereignty  Estimate of strength of  Number of
rconstraint  (3=maximum;  member
I  =rminimum)  countries (1993)
European Union  Free trade zone; free mobility of factors of  3  14
production;  supranational legislation (labor,
environment, human rights).
Trade organization
World Trade Organization  Multilateral  tariff reductions  2  115
Mercosur  Free trade  in selected (industrial) products  2  4
Nafta  Free trade zone  2  3
EFTA  Free trade zone; makes European Economic Space  1  3
with the EU
ASEAN  Movements toward free trade (common preferential  1  7
tarift)
Cooperation council of Arab Gulf  1  6
states
CIS custom union  Free trade zone  1  4
CEFTA  Free trade  in selected (industrial) products  1  4
CARICOM  Movement toward free trade  1  445
Exchange  rate  agreements
CFA Franc a/  No independent  monetary policy  3  14
Eastern Caribbean  dollar a/  No independent  monetary policy  3  6
IMF Article VIII b/  Full currency convertibility  to be observed: limits a  2  85
._______________________  range  of macro  policies
Formally  pegged to a single  Limits independent  monetary policy  2  21
currency or a currency board c/
Formally pegged  to a composite  Limits independent  monetary policy  1  19
currency or a group of currencies  dl
Cartels
OPEC e/  Determines  countries' oil export quotas  2  12
Note: The actual number  of member countries can slightly vary from the number given here since some member countries may not be included in our sample (e.g.
Luxembourg and Slovenia are member of respectively EU and CEFTA but are not included in the sample).
Data sources: Descriptions of various organizations obtained from IMF World wide web, Yearbook of Intemational Organizations 1994  published by Union of Inernational
Associations, web sites of different organizations (e.g. Mercosur, WTO), and experts'  opinions.
a/ Intemational monetary fund, 1994 Annual Report, Appendix 2, Table  1.  16.
b/ International monetary fund, 1994 Annual Report, Appendix 2, Table 11.15.
c/ International monetary fund, 1994 Annual Report, Appendix 2, Table 11.16. All countries with single currency pegs (including those pegged to SDR).
d/ International monetary fund, 1994 Annual Report, Appendix 2, Table 11.16. All countries with limited flexibility of the currency with respect to another single currency
or a group of currencies; and countries with a fixed peg against a currency composite. Countries belonging to the European exchange rate mechanism not included because their
interdependtncy is already reflected in the EU membership.
t/  No other cartel was included since by 1993-94 most have either dissolved (cocoa, sugar, and tin) or become irrelevant (coffee and rubber).46
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